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Human?Computer Interaction
[The designers] had no intention of ignoring the human
factor ... But the technological questions became so
overwhelming that they commanded the most attention.
John Fuller
Death by Robot
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Possible Roles for Computers in Control Loops
Computer reads and interprets sensor data for operator
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Computer provides information and advice to operator
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More Roles for Computers in Control Loops
Computer interprets and displays data for operator and
issues commands; operator makes varying levels of decisions.
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Computer assumes complete control with operator
providing advice or high?level supervision or simply
monitoring.
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Role of Humans in Automated Systems
The Human as Monitor
Task may be impossible
Dependent on information provided
State of information more indirect
Failures may be silent or masked
Little active behavior can lead to lower alertness and
vigilance, complacency, and overreliance.
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Role of Humans in Automated Systems (con’t.)
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The Human as Backup
May lead to lowered proficiency and increased
reluctance to intervene
Fault intolerance may lead to even larger errors
May make crisis handling more difficult
The Human as Partner
May be left with miscellaneous tasks
Tasks may be more complex and new tasks added
By taking away easy parts, may make difficult parts
harder
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HMI Design
Simple solution is to automate as much as possible, but
is this the best solution?
Different is not necessarily better.
Need to consider conflicts between HMI design qualities.
Norman: Appropriate design should:
Assume the existence of error.
Continually provide feedback.
Continually interact with operators in an effective manner.
Allow for the worst situation possible.
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HMI Design Process
Validate design
loops for changes and redesign.
Use feedback from incident and
accident reports and feedback
design to identify residual hazards.
Design the HMI with requirements
Identify HCI safety requirements
Establish operational information
sources and feedback loops.
and hazards in mind.
Perform a hazard analysis on the
Redesign and implement.
and constraints.
safety?critical operator errors.
to identify high?risk tasks and
Perform a system hazard analysis
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Matching Tasks to Human Characteristics
Tailor systems to human requirements instead of vice versa.
Design to withstand normal, expected human behavior.
Design to combat lack of alertness.
Design for error tolerance:
Help operators monitor themselves and recover from errors.
Provide feedback about actions operators took and their effects.
Allow for recovery from erroneous actions.
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Altimeters
Fuel boost pumps
Air speed bugs
Pressurization
Approach checklist COMPLETE
4 ON
ON
Cont Ignition
Seat Belt
ON
ON
Approach
Anti?skid
Allocating Tasks
Design considerations.
Failure detection.
Making allocation decisions.
Emergency shutdown.
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.
.
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Reducing Human Errors
Make safety enhancing actions easy, natural, and
difficult to omit or do wrong.
Stopping an unsafe action or leaving an unsafe state
should require one keystroke.
Make dangerous actions difficult or impossible.
Potentially dangerous commands should require
two or more unique actions.
Provide references for making decisions.
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Reducing Human Errors (2)
Follow human stereotypes.
Make sequences dissimilar if need to avoid confusion
between them.
Make errors physically impossible or obvious.
Use physical interlocks (but be careful about this).
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Providing Information and Feedback
Analyze task to determine what information is needed.
Provide feedback:
About effect of operator’s actions
To detect human errors
About state of system
To update mental models
To detect system faults
Provide for failure of computer displays (by alternate
sources of information.
Instrumentation to deal with malfunction must not be
disabled by the malfunction.
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Providing Information and Feedback (2)
Inform operators of anomalies, actions taken, and
current system state.
Fail obviously or make graceful degradation obvious
to operator.
Making displays easily interpretable is not always best.
Feedforward assistance:
Predictor displays
Procedural checklists and guides (be careful)
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Alarms
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Issues:
Overload
Incredulity Response
Relying on as primary rather than backup (management by exception)
Guidelines:
Keep spurious alarms to a minimum.
Provide checks to distinguish correct from faulty instruments.
Provide checks on alarm system itself.
Distinguish between routine and critical alarms.
Indicate which condition is responsible for alarm
Provide temporal information about events and state changes.
Require corrective action when necessary.
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Training and Maintaining Skills
May need to be more extensive and deep.
Required skill levels go up (not down) with automation.
Teach how the software works.
Teach about safety features and design rationale.
Teach for general strategies rather than specific responses.
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Mode Confusion
General term for a class of situation?awareness errors
High tech automation changing cognitive demands on operators
Supervising rather than directly controlling
More cognitively complex decision making
Complicated, mode?rich systems
Increased need for cooperation and communication
Human?factors experts complaining about technology?centered
automation
Designers focus on technical issues, not on supporting operator tasks
Leads to "clumsy" automation
Errors are changing, e.g. errors of omission vs. commission
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Mode Confusion (2)
Early automated systems had fairly small number of modes.
Provided passive background on which operator would act by
entering target data and requesting system operations.
Also had only one overall mode setting for each function performed.
Indications of currently active mode and of transitions between
modes could be dedicated to one location on display.
Consequences of breakdown in mode awareness fairly small.
Operators seemed able to detect and recover from erroneous
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actions relatively quickly.
Mode Confusion (3)
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Flexibility of advanced automation allows designers to develop
more complicated, mode?rich systems.
Result was numerous mode indications spread over multiple displays
each containing just that portion of mode status data corresponding
to a particular system or subsystem.
Designs also allow for interactions across modes.
Increased capabilities of automation create increased delays between
user input and feedback about system behavior.
These changes have led to:
Increased difficulty of error or failure detection and recovery
Challenges to human’s ability to maintain awareness of
active modes
armed modes
interactions between environmental status and mode behavior
interactions across modes
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Mode Confusion Analysis
Identify ‘‘predictable error forms’’
accidents and incidents
simulator studies
Model blackbox software behavior
Identify modeled software behavior likely to lead to
operator error.
Reduce probability of error occurring:
Redesign the automation
Design appropriate HCI
Change operational procedures and training
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Design Flaws
1. Interface interpretation errors
Software interprets input wrong
Multiple conditions mapped to same output
Mulhouse (A320):
Crew directed automated system to fly in TRACK/FLIGHT PATH mode,
which is a combined mode related both to lateral (TRACK) and vertical
(flight path angle) navigation. When they were given radar vectors by the
air traffic controller, they may have switched from the TRACK to the
HDG SEL mode to be able to enter the heading requested by the controller.
However, pushing the button to change the lateral mode also automatically
changes the vertical mode from FLIGHT PATH ANGLE to VERTICAL
SPEED, i.e., the mode switch button affects both lateral and vertical
navigation. When the pilots subsequently entered "33" to select the desired
flight path angle of 3.3 degrees, the automation interpreted their input as a
desired vertical speed of 3300 ft. Pilots were not aware of active "interface
mode" and failed to detect the problem. As a consequence of too steep a
descent, the airplane crashed into a mountain.
Operating room medical device:
The device has two operating modes: warmup and normal. It starts in
warmup mode whenever either of two particular settings are adjusted by
the operator (anesthesiologist). The meaning of alarm messages and
the effect of controls are different in these two modes, but neither the
current device operating mode nor a change in mode are indicated to
the operator. In addition, four distinct alarm?triggering conditions are
mapped onto two alarm messages so that the same message has
different meanings depending on the operating mode. In order to
understand what internal condition triggered the message, the
operator must infer which malfunction is being indicated by the alarm.
Display modes: In some devices, user?entered target values interpreted
differently depending on active display mode.
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Design Flaws
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2. Inconsistent behavior
Harder for operator to learn how automation works
Important because pilots changing scanning behavior
In go?around below 100 feet, pilots failed to anticipate and realize
autothrust system did not arm when they selected TOGA power
because it did so under all other circumstances where TOGA power
is applied (found in simulator study of A320).
Cali
Bangalore (A320): a protection function is provided in all automation
configurations except the ALTITUDE ACQUISITION mode in which
autopilot was operating.
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Design Flaws
3. Indirect mode changes
Automation changes mode without direct command
Activating one mode can activate different modes
depending on system status at time of manipulation.
Bangalore (A320):
Pilot put plane into OPEN DESCENT mode without realizing it. Resulted
in aircraft speed being controlled by pitch rather than thrust, i.e., throttles
went to idle. In that mode, automation ignores any preprogrammed altitude
constraints. To maintain pilot?selected speed without power, automation
had to use an excessive rate of descent, which led to crash short of runway.
How could this happen?
Three different ways to activate OPEN DESCENT mode:
1) Pull altitude knob after select lower altitude.
2) Pull speed knob when aircraft in EXPEDITE mode.
3) Select a lower altitude while in ALTITUDE ACQUISITION mode.
Pilot must not have been aware that aircraft was within 200 feet of previously
entered target altitude (which puts into ALTITUDE ACQUISITION mode).
Thus may not have expected selection of lower altitude at that time to result
in mode transition. So may not have closely monitored his mode annunciations.
Discovered what happened at 10 secs before impact ?? too late to recover
with engines at idle.
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Design Flaws (2)
4. Operator authority limits
Prevents actions that would lead to hazardous state
May prohibit maneuvers needed in extreme situations
Warsaw
During one A320 approach, pilots disconnected the autopilot while leaving
the flight director engaged. Under these conditions, the automation provides
automatic speed protection by preventing aircraft from exceeding upper and
lower airspeed limits. At some point during approach, after flaps 20 had been
selected, the aircraft exceeded airspeed limit for that configuration by 2 kts.
As a result, the automation intervened by pitching the airplane up to reduce
airspeed back to 195 kts. The pilots, who were unaware that automatic speed
protection was active, observed the uncommanded automation behavior.
Concerned about the unexpected reduction in airspeed at this critical phase
of flight, they rapidly increased thrust to counterbalance the automation. As
a consequence of this sudden burst of power, the airplane pitched up to about
50 degrees, entered a sharp left bank, and went into a dive. The pilots eventually
disengaged the autothrust system and its associated protection function and
regained control of the aircraft.
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Design Flaws (2)
5. Unintended side effects
An action intended to have one effect has an additional one
Because approach is such a busy time and the automation requires so
much heads down work, pilots often program the automation as soon
as they are assigned a runway.
In an A320 simulator study, discovered that pilots were not aware that
entering a runway change AFTER entering the data for the assigned
approach results in the deletion of all previously entered altitude and
speed constraints even though they may still apply.
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Design Flaws (2)
6. Lack of appropriate feedback
Operator needs feedback to predict or anticipate mode changes
Independent information needed to detect computer errors
Bangalore (A320): PF had disengaged his flight director during approach and
was assuming PNF would do the same. Result would have been a mode
configuration in which airspeed is automatically controlled by the autothrottle
(the SPEED mode), which is the recommended procedure for the approach
phase. However, the PNF never turned off his flight director, and the OPEN
DESCENT mode became active when a lower altitude was selected. This
indirect mode change led to the hazardous state and eventually the accident.
But a complicating factor was that each pilot only received an indication of
the status of his own flight director and not all the information necessary to
determine whether the desired mode would be engaged. The lack of feedback
or knowledge of the complete system state contributed to the pilots not
detecting the unsafe state in time to reverse it.
. Example: Oops, It Didn’t Arm (Everett Palmer, NASA Ames)
"Automation surprises" occur when the automation behaves in a manner that is different from what the
operator is expecting. In the following case, a reasonable sequence of pilot actions performed in a high
workload situation resulted in an unusual and undesirable result ?? an automation surprise. In this case,
the automation worked as designed.
Altitude deviations are the most common incident reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System ?? they
are reported at the rate of about one per hour.In the following case, an automatic mode transition leads to a
altitude deviation. This is such a common problem that it has been given a name, a "kill?the?capture" bust.
Hundreds of similar altitude deviations have been reported to the ASRS. The only unique thing about this
incident is that it occurred during a full?mission simulator study and was recorded for later analysis.
The incident took less than 20 seconds to play out. The crew had just made a missed approach and had
climbed to and leveled at 2,100 feet. They received the clearance to "climb now and maintain 5000 feet "
The Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) showed:
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A. Level at 2100 ft.
They received the clearance to :"... climb now and maintain 5000 feet ..." After some communication
confusion on the cleared altitude (5,000 or 15,000) and which radial to hold on (0?0?6 or 0?6?0), the
Captain set the MCP altitude window to 5,000 feet,
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B. Enter 5000 in MCP
set the autopilot pitch mode to vertical speed with a value of approximately 2,000 feet per minute,
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C Set VERT/SPD.
and set the autothrottle to SPD mode with a value of 255 knots.
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Enter 255 in MCP
D.
speed window
Climbing through 3,500 feet, the Captain called for flaps up and at 4,000 feet he called for slats retract.
As the aircraft climbed from 4,000 to 5,000 feet, the first officer was copying the holding clearance.
Climbing through 4,000 feet, the FMA showed:
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E.
Approaching
4000 feet.
186
SPD
CAP
VOR
HLD
ALT
SPD
186
ALT
CAP
VOR ALT
HLD
186
SPD
ALT
CAP
VOR VERT
SPD
255
SPD
ALT
CAP
VOR VERT
SPD
255
SPD
ALT
TRK
VOR VERT
SPD
.
Passing through 4000 feet, the Captain pushed the IAS button on the MCP. The pitch mode became IAS
and the autothrottles went to CLAMP mode.
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F. Push IAS
Altitude capture was still armed. Three seconds later, the autopilot automatically switched to altitude
capture mode. The FMA arm window went blank and the pitch window showed ALT/CAP.
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G.
Automatic altitude
capture
A tenth of a second later, the Captain adjusted the vertical speed wheel to a value of about 4000
feet a minute. This caused the pitch autopilot mode to switch from altitude capture to vertical speed.
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H
Adjust vertical
speed
Climbing through 4500 feet, the approaching altitude light was on. As the altitude passed through
5,000 feet at a vertical velocity of about 4,000 feet per minute, the Captain remarked "Five thousand.
Oops, it didn’t arm." He pushed the MCP ALT/HLD button and switched off the autopilot. The
aircraft continued to climb to about 5,500 feet and the "ALTITUDE ? ALTITUDE" voice warning
sounded repeatedly.
Exercise: What was the problem in the automation design that led to this incident?
Comments: As in many incidents involving automation, the error was first detected by the pilots not by
using the autoflight displays such as the Flight Mode Annunciators that tell the state of the automation,
but by the basic aircraft displays such as the alitmeter and the vertical speed indicator. The crew was
apparently aware of the state of the aircraft but not aware of the state of the automation. The error was
detected by observing the unexpected state of the basic aircraft displays, not the automation display.
Woods has observed that most errors that result from the use of automation are detected by observing
the system response and not the automation mode display.
In this incident, the automation display (the FMA) indicated what was actually happening; however the
immediate response of the aircraft and the primary aircraft instruments were normal. The unusual and
unexpected aircraft behavior occurred later. Although this is an error tolerant system, error detection
was delayed beyond the point where that was possible. Why might this be the case? What makes it
difficult to use the information in the FMA to verify the correct autoflight mode? A number of possible
reasons. First, the FMA must be read and its meaning interpreted. Sometimes what must be "read" and
interpreted is the absence of information. Second, the FMA’s physical location away from the MCP
requires that the pilot act in one place and check the outcome of the action in another place. Finally,
CLMP ALT
TRK
VOR
IAS
SPD
255 TRK
VOR
CAP
ALT
255
SPD
TRK
VOR VERT
SPD
the FMA does not provide a direct display of what the pilot needs to know to stay ahead of the aircraft,
i.e., What trajectory have I set up the automation to fly the aircraft on?
Condition to start leveling off
Change Pitch annunciator to IAS
AP in?mode On
AND
T
T
T
Pilot pushes IAS
AP in?mode On
T
TT
OR
Pilot pushes V/SPD button
Pilot adjusts V/SPD wheel
AND
RESULT:
Change Pitch annunciator to VRT SPD
AND
SPD
ALT CAP
ALT HOLD
IAS
VRT
Change Pitch annunciator to ALT HOLD
RESULT:
AND
In?mode ALT CAP
OR
AP in?mode On
Pilot pushes HOLD
Alt acquired
T
T
T
TT
AP in?mode On
Capture in?mode Armed
RESULT:
Start leveling off
Change Pitch annunciator to ALT CAP
T
T
T
RESULT:
Autothrottle goes to CLAMP mode
PITCH
MODE
SPD
VERT
CAP
ALT
HOLD
IAS
ALT
CAPTURE
ArmedNot Armed
MODE
OR OR
Capture in?mode
Armed
ALT CAP
Pilot pushes ALT
Pitch in?mode
T
T
T T
Pilot sets new higher alt
Pilot pulls ALT T
Not Armed
Capture in?mode
T
T T
Not Armed
Armed
AND
AND
RESULT:
RESULT:
Change Arm annunciator to blank Change Arm annunciator to ALT