7,Network Security 1
Chapter 7,Network security
Foundations:
? what is security?
? cryptography
? authentication
? message integrity
? key distribution and certification
Security in practice:
? application layer,secure e-mail
? transport layer,Internet commerce,SSL,SET
? network layer,IP security
7,Network Security 2
Friends and enemies,Alice,Bob,Trudy
? well-known in network security world
? Bob,Alice (lovers!) want to communicate,securely”
? Trudy,the,intruder” may intercept,delete,add
messages
Figure 7.1 goes here
7,Network Security 3
What is network security?
Secrecy,only sender,intended receiver
should,understand” msg contents
? sender encrypts msg
? receiver decrypts msg
Authentication,sender,receiver want to
confirm identity of each other
Message Integrity,sender,receiver want to
ensure message not altered (in transit,or
afterwards) without detection
7,Network Security 4
Internet security threats
Packet sniffing:
? broadcast media
? promiscuous NIC reads all packets passing by
? can read all unencrypted data (e.g,passwords)
?e.g.,C sniffs B’s packets
A
B
C
src:B dest:A payload
7,Network Security 5
Internet security threats
IP Spoofing:
?can generate,raw” IP packets directly from
application,putting any value into IP source
address field
?receiver can’t tell if source is spoofed
? e.g.,C pretends to be B
A
B
C
src:B dest:A payload
7,Network Security 6
Internet security threats
Denial of service (DOS):
?flood of maliciously generated packets,swamp”
receiver
? Distributed DOS (DDOS),multiple coordinated
sources swamp receiver
? e.g.,C and remote host SYN-attack A
A
B
C
SYN
SYNSYNSYN
SYN
SYN
SYN
7,Network Security 7
The language of cryptography
symmetric key crypto,sender,receiver keys identical
public-key crypto,encrypt key public,decrypt key
secret
Figure 7.3 goes here
plaintext plaintext
ciphertext
KA KB
7,Network Security 8
Symmetric key cryptography
substitution cipher,substituting one thing for another
? monoalphabetic cipher,substitute one letter for another
plaintext,abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
ciphertext,mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq
Plaintext,bob,i love you,alice
ciphertext,nkn,s gktc wky,mgsbc
E.g.:
Q,How hard to break this simple cipher?:
?brute force (how hard?)
?other?
7,Network Security 9
Symmetric key crypto,DES
DES,Data Encryption Standard
?US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
?56-bit symmetric key,64 bit plaintext input
?How secure is DES?
? DES Challenge,56-bit-key-encrypted phrase
(“Strong cryptography makes the world a safer
place”) decrypted (brute force) in 4 months
?no known,backdoor” decryption approach
?making DES more secure
? use three keys sequentially (3-DES) on each datum
? use cipher-block chaining
7,Network Security 10
Symmetric key
crypto,DES
initial permutation
16 identical,rounds” of
function application,
each using different
48 bits of key
final permutation
DES operation
7,Network Security 11
Public Key Cryptography
symmetric key crypto
? requires sender,
receiver know
shared secret key
? Q,how to agree on
key in first place
(particularly if
never,met”)?
public key cryptography
? radically different
approach [Diffie-
Hellman76,RSA78]
? sender,receiver do
not share secret key
? encryption key public
(known to all)
? decryption key
private (known only to
receiver)
7,Network Security 12
Public key cryptography
Figure 7.7 goes here
7,Network Security 13
Public key encryption algorithms
need d ( ) and e ( ) such that
d (e (m)) = mBB
B B
.,
need public and private keys
for d ( ) and e ( ).,BB
Two inter-related requirements:
1
2
RSA,Rivest,Shamir,Adelson algorithm
7,Network Security 14
RSA,Choosing keys
1,Choose two large prime numbers p,q.
(e.g.,1024 bits each)
2,Compute n = pq,z = (p-1)(q-1)
3,Choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors
with z,(e,z are,relatively prime”).
4,Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z.
(in other words,ed mod z = 1 ).
5,Public key is (n,e),Private key is (n,d).
7,Network Security 15
RSA,Encryption,decryption
0,Given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above
1,To encrypt bit pattern,m,compute
c = m mod ne (i.e.,remainder when m is divided by n)e
2,To decrypt received bit pattern,c,compute
m = c mod nd (i.e.,remainder when c is divided by n)d
m = (m mod n)e mod ndMagichappens!
7,Network Security 16
RSA example:
Bob chooses p=5,q=7,Then n=35,z=24.
e=5 (so e,z relatively prime).
d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z.
letter m me c = m mod ne
l 12 1524832 17
c m = c mod nd
17 481968572106750915091411825223072000 12
cd letter
l
encrypt:
decrypt:
7,Network Security 17
RSA,Why,m = (m mod n)e mod nd
(m mod n)e mod n = m mod nd ed
Number theory result,If p,q prime,n = pq,then
x mod n = x mod ny y mod (p-1)(q-1)
= m mod ned mod (p-1)(q-1)
= m mod n1
= m
(using number theory result above)
(since we chose ed to be divisible by
(p-1)(q-1) with remainder 1 )
7,Network Security 18
Authentication
Goal,Bob wants Alice to,prove” her identity
to him
Protocol ap1.0,Alice says,I am Alice”
Failure scenario
7,Network Security 19
Authentication,another try
Protocol ap2.0,Alice says,I am Alice” and sends her IP
address along to,prove” it.
Failure scenario
7,Network Security 20
Authentication,another try
Protocol ap3.0,Alice says,I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to,prove” it.
Failure scenario?
7,Network Security 21
Authentication,yet another try
Protocol ap3.1,Alice says,I am Alice” and sends her
encrypted secret password to,prove” it.
Failure scenario?
I am Alice
encrypt(password)
7,Network Security 22
Authentication,yet another try
Goal,avoid playback attack
Failures,drawbacks?
Figure 7.11 goes here
Nonce,number (R) used onlyonce in a lifetime
ap4.0,to prove Alice,live”,Bob sends Alice nonce,R,Alice
must return R,encrypted with shared secret key
7,Network Security 23
Figure 7.12 goes here
Authentication,ap5.0
ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key
? problem,how do Bob,Alice agree on key
? can we authenticate using public key techniques?
ap5.0,use nonce,public key cryptography
7,Network Security 24
Figure 7.14 goes here
ap5.0,security hole
Man (woman) in the middle attack,Trudy poses
as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)
Need,certified” public
keys (more later …)
7,Network Security 25
Digital Signatures
Cryptographic technique
analogous to hand-
written signatures.
? Sender (Bob) digitally signs
document,establishing he
is document owner/creator,
? Verifiable,nonforgeable:
recipient (Alice) can verify
that Bob,and no one else,
signed document.
Simple digital signature
for message m:
? Bob encrypts m with his
private key dB,creating
signed message,dB(m).
? Bob sends m and dB(m) to
Alice.
7,Network Security 26
Digital Signatures (more)
? Suppose Alice receives
msg m,and digital
signature dB(m)
? Alice verifies m signed
by Bob by applying
Bob’s public key eB to
dB(m) then checks
eB(dB(m) ) = m.
? If eB(dB(m) ) = m,
whoever signed m must
have used Bob’s
private key.
Alice thus verifies that:
? Bob signed m.
? No one else signed m.
? Bob signed m and not m’.
Non-repudiation:
? Alice can take m,and
signature dB(m) to court
and prove that Bob
signed m.
7,Network Security 27
Message Digests
Computationally expensive
to public-key-encrypt
long messages
Goal,fixed-length,easy to
compute digital
signature,“fingerprint”
? apply hash function H
to m,get fixed size
message digest,H(m).
Hash function properties:
? Many-to-1
? Produces fixed-size msg
digest (fingerprint)
? Given message digest x,
computationally infeasible
to find m such that x =
H(m)
? computationally infeasible
to find any two messages m
and m’ such that H(m) =
H(m’).
7,Network Security 28
Digital signature = Signed message digest
Bob sends digitally signed
message,Alice verifies signature and integrity of digitally signed
message:
7,Network Security 29
Hash Function Algorithms
? Internet checksum
would make a poor
message digest.
? Too easy to find
two messages with
same checksum.
? MD5 hash function widely
used.
? Computes 128-bit
message digest in 4-step
process,
? arbitrary 128-bit string
x,appears difficult to
construct msg m whose
MD5 hash is equal to x.
? SHA-1 is also used.
? US standard
? 160-bit message digest
7,Network Security 30
Trusted Intermediaries
Problem:
? How do two entities
establish shared
secret key over
network?
Solution:
? trusted key
distribution center
(KDC) acting as
intermediary
between entities
Problem:
? When Alice obtains
Bob’s public key
(from web site,e-
mail,diskette),how
does she know it is
Bob’s public key,not
Trudy’s?
Solution:
? trusted certification
authority (CA)
7,Network Security 31
Key Distribution Center (KDC)
? Alice,Bob need shared
symmetric key.
? KDC,server shares
different secret key
with each registered
user,
? Alice,Bob know own
symmetric keys,KA-KDC
KB-KDC,for
communicating with
KDC,
? Alice communicates with
KDC,gets session key R1,and
KB-KDC(A,R1)
? Alice sends Bob
KB-KDC(A,R1),Bob extracts R1
? Alice,Bob now share the
symmetric key R1.
7,Network Security 32
Certification Authorities
? Certification authority
(CA) binds public key to
particular entity.
? Entity (person,router,
etc.) can register its public
key with CA.
? Entity provides,proof
of identity” to CA,
? CA creates certificate
binding entity to public
key.
? Certificate digitally
signed by CA.
? When Alice wants Bob’s public
key:
? gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or
elsewhere).
? Apply CA’s public key to Bob’s
certificate,get Bob’s public
key
7,Network Security 33
Secure e-mail
? generates random symmetric private key,KS.
? encrypts message with KS
? also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key.
? sends both KS(m) and eB(KS) to Bob.
? Alice wants to send secret e-mail message,m,to Bob.
7,Network Security 34
Secure e-mail (continued)
? Alice wants to provide sender authentication
message integrity.
? Alice digitally signs message.
? sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature.
7,Network Security 35
Secure e-mail (continued)
? Alice wants to provide secrecy,sender authentication,
message integrity.
Note,Alice uses both her private key,Bob’s public
key.
7,Network Security 36
Pretty good privacy (PGP)
? Internet e-mail encryption
scheme,a de-facto
standard.
? Uses symmetric key
cryptography,public key
cryptography,hash
function,and digital
signature as described.
? Provides secrecy,sender
authentication,integrity.
? Inventor,Phil Zimmerman,
was target of 3-year
federal investigation.
---BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE---
Hash,SHA1
Bob:My husband is out of town
tonight.Passionately yours,
Alice
---BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE---
Version,PGP 5.0
Charset,noconv
yhHJRHhGJGhgg/12EpJ+lo8gE4vB3mqJ
hFEvZP9t6n7G6m5Gw2
---END PGP SIGNATURE---
A PGP signed message:
7,Network Security 37
Secure sockets layer (SSL)
? PGP provides security for a
specific network app.
? SSL works at transport
layer,Provides security to
any TCP-based app using
SSL services,
? SSL,used between WWW
browsers,servers for I-
commerce (shttp).
? SSL security services:
? server authentication
? data encryption
? client authentication
(optional)
? Server authentication:
? SSL-enabled browser
includes public keys for
trusted CAs.
? Browser requests server
certificate,issued by
trusted CA.
? Browser uses CA’s public
key to extract server’s
public key from
certificate,
? Visit your browser’s
security menu to see its
trusted CAs.
7,Network Security 38
SSL (continued)
Encrypted SSL session:
? Browser generates
symmetric session key,
encrypts it with server’s
public key,sends encrypted
key to server.
? Using its private key,server
decrypts session key.
? Browser,server agree that
future msgs will be
encrypted.
? All data sent into TCP
socket (by client or server)
i encrypted with session
key.
? SSL,basis of IETF
Transport Layer Security
(TLS).
? SSL can be used for non-
Web applications,e.g.,
IMAP.
? Client authentication can
be done with client
certificates.
7,Network Security 39
Secure electronic transactions (SET)
? designed for payment-card
transactions over Internet.
? provides security services
among 3 players:
? customer
? merchant
? merchant’s bank
All must have certificates.
? SET specifies legal
meanings of certificates.
? apportionment of
liabilities for
transactions
? Customer’s card number
passed to merchant’s bank
without merchant ever
seeing number in plain text.
? Prevents merchants from
stealing,leaking payment
card numbers.
? Three software components:
? Browser wallet
? Merchant server
? Acquirer gateway
? See text for description of
SET transaction.
7,Network Security 40
Ipsec,Network Layer Security
? Network-layer secrecy:
? sending host encrypts the
data in IP datagram
? TCP and UDP segments;
ICMP and SNMP
messages.
? Network-layer authentication
? destination host can
authenticate source IP
address
? Two principle protocols:
? authentication header
(AH) protocol
? encapsulation security
payload (ESP) protocol
? For both AH and ESP,source,
destination handshake:
? create network-layer
logical channel called a
service agreement (SA)
? Each SA unidirectional.
? Uniquely determined by:
? security protocol (AH or
ESP)
? source IP address
? 32-bit connection ID
7,Network Security 41
ESP Protocol
? Provides secrecy,host
authentication,data
integrity.
? Data,ESP trailer
encrypted.
? Next header field is in
ESP trailer.
? ESP authentication
field is similar to AH
authentication field.
? Protocol = 50,
7,Network Security 42
Authentication Header (AH) Protocol
? Provides source host
authentication,data
integrity,but not secrecy.
? AH header inserted
between IP header and IP
data field.
? Protocol field = 51.
? Intermediate routers
process datagrams as usual.
AH header includes:
? connection identifier
? authentication data,signed
message digest,calculated
over original IP datagram,
providing source
authentication,data integrity.
? Next header field,specifies
type of data (TCP,UDP,ICMP,
etc.)
7,Network Security 43
Network Security (summary)
Basic techniques…...
?cryptography (symmetric and public)
?authentication
?message integrity
…,used in many different security scenarios
?secure email
?secure transport (SSL)
?IP sec
See also,firewalls,in network management