*
A/CONF.187/1.
V.99-90986 (E)
United Nations A/CONF.187/6
Tenth
United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders
Vienna, 10-17 April 2000
Distr.: General
15 December 1999
Original: English
Item 4 of the provisional agenda
*
International Cooperation in Combating Transnational
Crime: New Challenges in the Twenty-first Century
Working paper prepared by the Secretariat
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction ....................................................... 1-3 2
II. Concepts and definitions ............................................. 4-6 2
III. Concerns ........................................................ 7-11 2
IV. Controversial issues................................................. 12-25 3
V. Points for discussion ................................................ 26-37 5
VI. Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime and the protocols thereto .............................. 38-43 7
A/CONF.187/6
2
I. Introduction
1. The present document examines some of the realistic
and imaginary fears related to transnational organized
crime today. It is a discussion paper, in the sense that some
issues are identified, questions are posed and controversies
are highlighted, but no final solutions are provided.
2. Some definitions of transnational organized crime are
presented in chapter II, and the concerns surrounding the
growth of this type of crime are described and critiqued in
chapter III. Some controversial issues arising from
research follow in chapter IV, and the points for discussion
in chapter V provide food for thought.
3. In its resolution 53/111 of 9 December 1998, the
General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc
committee to elaborate an international convention against
transnational organized crime and to discuss international
instruments addressing trafficking in women and children,
combating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in
firearms, and illegal trafficking in and transporting of
migrants. The Ad Hoc Committee began its work in 1999
and is expected to complete it by the end of 2000. Because
the Convention is an instrument to promote international
cooperation in dealing with one aspect of transnational
crime, namely transnational organized crime, a section on
the implementation of the Convention and its protocols has
also been included in the present document (chapter VI).
II. Concepts and definitions
4. A number of crucial elements need to be carefully
examined if a definition of transnational organized crime
is to be attempted. The following standard definition,
which was used in the report on the results of the Fourth
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of
Criminal Justice Systems, could apply to a variety of cases:
“offences, whose inception, perpetration and/or direct
effect or indirect effects involved more than one country”
(A/CONF.169/15/Add.1, para. 9).
5. Transnational crime, however, is a broad concept
covering different offences that mainly fall, at times
simultaneously, in the domain of organized crime,
corporate crime, professional crime and political crime. In
analytical terms, distinctions between these types of crimes
appear to be easy to draw. For example, it can be suggested
that organized crime is normally carried out by illegal
enterprises, whereas corporate crime can be identified with
illegal behaviour adopted by legitimate companies to
reduce cost and maximize profits.
1
It could also be argued
that, while professional criminals generally refrain from
intimidation and violence against official authorities,
members of organized crime are both inclined and able to
use intimidation and violence.
2
It is also true that terrorist
groups engaged in racketeering have different features than
those of more conventional criminal organizations, a major
feature being the different goals they pursue. However,
these distinctions do not alter the fact that it is extremely
difficult to draw precise definitional boundaries between
organized and corporate crime.
3
6. Controversies may arise when attention focuses on
the adjective “transnational”, which implies that the types
of crime under discussion always and solely take place
across borders. This is not always the case. Most illegal
markets are an example. Illicit goods are produced locally,
and only their distribution takes place internationally.
Another example is trafficking in human beings, where
illegal migrants are recruited at specific locations and only
the trafficking operations take on an international
character. Moreover, many conventional organized groups
owe their international power to the resources they
accumulate in their specific local context.
III. Concerns
7. Official concerns about transnational crime appear to
be centred on the feeling of vulnerability that developed
countries harbour towards criminal activity originating in
other countries. This manifests itself through fears that
illicit goods, more dangerous than any of those produced
by developed countries, may destroy the citizens and
institutions of the civilized world.
8. It is difficult to provide a comprehensive overview of
the main contemporary manifestations of transnational
crime. Little empirical research is available, and existing
studies focus mainly on the national and local impact of
transnational crime. The United Nations through its global
studies on transnational organized crime, is trying to fill
this gap.
9. Transnational organized crime should not be
exclusively identified with the illegal activities of
organizations such as the Italian Mafia, Russian organized
crime syndicates, the Chinese triads, the Japanese yakuza,
the Colombian cartels or the Nigerian networks.
4
These
criminal organizations may perhaps constitute the most
A/CONF.187/6
3
powerful groups engaged in transnational criminal
activities, but they are far from monopolizing such
activities. Similarly, attention should not be focused solely
on conventional activities such as the drug trade,
trafficking in human beings or stolen goods and the
laundering of illegal proceeds. Transnational crime may
well transcend such conventional activities and take on
more complex features. It may, for example, mingle with
entrepreneurial and, at times, governmental deviance. This
occurs when legally produced goods are illegally marketed,
as in the case of smuggling nuclear material, armaments,
pharmaceutical products, tobacco, alcohol, food and so on.
This also occurs when the illegal marketing of goods
produced in one country is supported by the complicity of
corrupt politicians in a country in which those goods are
officially banned.
10. Transnational organized crime includes tax evasion,
the forgery of clothes and electronic equipment, fraud
against international financial institutions, unfair
competition on international markets, industrial espionage,
the import and export of protected plants and animals,
trafficking in works of art and the illegal dumping of toxic
industrial waste. It also involves not only illegal activities
by terrorist groups or organizations but also the violation
of sanctions and embargoes imposed on countries by the
international community and includes aggression against
countries in the form of war and genocide.
11. Most transnational criminal activity is accompanied
by such illegal acts as the corruption of officials, which
facilitates both the commission of an offence and its
concealment, and money-laundering, through banking
institutions or off-shore agencies. A final concern is that
perpetrators of transnational organized crime are willing
and able, as necessary, to use violence for the pursuit of
their interests.
IV. Controversial issues
12. In the past few decades, the transnationalization of
criminal activity has increased substantially. The increase
is due not only to the geographical distance over which
crimes are committed but also to the frequency with which
criminals operate across regional and national borders.
This development is not taking place in isolation but is part
of the general process of globalization.
13. Economic interdependence and the increase in
international economic exchange make the transfer of
goods and the movement of people across borders easier.
Illegal traffickers take advantage of these developments
using parallel or overlapping commercial routes. This may
explain why so many groups that are involved in
transnational criminal activity own transport firms and/or
import-export businesses.
14. Causes of crime are always hard to establish,
although some remarks on transnational organized crime
can be attempted. It could be tentatively suggested that
many types of transnational crime are caused by:
(a) The great economic disparity existing in the
world. One consequence of that disparity is that, in many
countries, large sections of the population are lured into
producing illegal goods. Many people are also vulnerable
to physical exploitation, for example in the form of
prostitution, by criminal organizations. Moreover, poor
countries offer attractive markets for goods that are stolen
in more affluent ones. Simultaneously, advanced countries,
owing to high production costs and/or high taxes, often
expand the hidden sectors of their economy and employ
cheap unregistered workers;
(b) Political conflicts erupting in many countries
and regions, which generate widespread violence and
encourage trafficking in human beings and illegal arms.
Countries at war may have a financial interest in other
forms of crime, such as the illegal import of arms. In doing
so, they establish illicit partnerships with other countries.
15. Hence, one controversial issue is the extent to which
more economically advanced countries foster transnational
crime. For example, in respect of illicit drugs, many
officials in developed consuming countries are prone to
attribute responsibilities to producing countries and fail to
consider how a preexisting pharmacological culture
allowed illicit drug use to develop. They also overlook the
demand side of the equation, focused as they are and on the
assumption that proceeds generated by illicit drugs are
only appropriated by foreign producers and large
distributors. They thus consider the considerable revenues
generated by illicit drugs within the consuming countries
themselves.
16. A second controversial issue is that transnational
organized crime is seen by many officials to be the result
of the growing numbers and variety of individuals and
groups reaching more economically advanced countries.
Since such individuals and groups arrive from places
scattered around the world, and often from countries in
transition or in turmoil, they are perceived as being
difficult to control and impervious to integration. The
A/CONF.187/6
4
newcomers are said to bring with them their social and
commercial networks, which make law enforcement
difficult and, at the same time, facilitate “conspiracy”.
5
No
attention is given to similar difficulties encountered by law
enforcers prior to the arrival of migrants and to the
commercial “conspiracy” that already features in host
countries long before they are “invaded” by aliens. In other
words, the fact that migrants find in the host countries the
social and institutional environment that makes their illicit
enterprises possible is normally deemed unworthy of any
analytical effort.
17. Some definitions of transnational crime imply a
notion of ethnic succession. According to this notion,
certain national cultures and groups are expected to climb
the crime ladder and eventually occupy a prominent
position in illegal markets. Official classifications of
organized crime, for example, have often been inspired by
ethnic qualifications and categories.
18. Criminological analysis has long disputed the
“ethnicity trap”,
6
both because of the large number of
ethnic groups involved in transnational organized crime
and because of the interaction in which they engage in
criminal business. Given the increasing social,
geographical and inter-cultural mobility, ethnicity may be
seen less as a causal or facilitating factor than mobility
itself.
19. More attention should be given to analysing how
geographical, social and cultural mobility may facilitate
criminal undertakings. More specifically, analysis should
focus on how criminal activity conducted by aliens needs
a receptive environment, along with a range of indigenous
partners and agents, in the countries in which criminal
activities are carried out. Many officials are concerned
that, because migrant communities or groups of ethnic
settlers are marginalized, they are believed to support the
criminal enterprises run by their compatriots. This belief
should be challenged, and the facile equation migrants plus
marginalization equal crime should be severely criticized.
In this respect, a different issue could be explored, namely
that ethnic minority groups, in order to develop criminal
entrepreneurship, need partners among the indigenous
groups of the very host society marginalizing them.
Partnerships with legitimate entrepreneurs of the host
country, moreover, may offer larger guarantees that, along
with official commercial consortia, effective smuggling
lines are also set up.
20. The investment of illegitimate proceeds in
economically advanced countries raises other controversial
issues. Some studies indicate that criminal groups are
slowly abandoning their involvement in visible economic
activities and are diverting criminal profits towards the
more secretive financial sector.
7
This diversion is said to
make detection more difficult and the confiscation of assets
problematic. The entry of transnational criminal operators
in the financial world is believed to herald potential
disruption, distortion of rules, erosion of ethics and
suppression of competition; ultimately, it is assumed to
foster a “purge” among entrepreneurs, leading to the
survival of those more criminally fit. Some arguments
behind this belief are given below.
21. Organized criminal groups have been charged with
upsetting the harmonious relationship between demand and
supply. By making illicit goods available, for example,
they are said to reduce the aggregate demand for licit
goods in the market and consequently to limit the revenues
of the legitimate companies producing and distributing
them. This argument implicitly rules out the possibility that
criminal proceeds may be used to acquire licit goods,
although there is no evidence that members of organized
crime groups are more restrained spenders than ordinary
consumers. It has also been argued, however, that
organized criminal groups have a low propensity for
consumption because their illicit income continues to
circulate within criminal markets to finance subsequent
illicit initiatives. It has also been claimed that criminals
tend to transfer abroad parts of their earnings, thus
depriving the country in which they operate of substantial
funds.
22. Yet another controversial issue emerges here,
because these are hardly specific characteristics of
organized crime. Legitimate entrepreneurs also accumulate
inert wealth and may fail to translate all their earnings into
dynamic investment or consumption. Some legitimate
entrepreneurs and politicians may also transfer money
abroad, and, despite the existence of permissive rules
legally allowing them to move their capital across borders,
they find ways of increasing the sums moved by resorting
to illegal practices. It is worth pointing out, in this respect,
that so-called “hot money”, which is commonly and almost
automatically associated with criminal proceeds being
laundered, in fact includes money earned, legitimately or
otherwise, by official actors.
8
Monies that are used for or
accumulated through tax evasion, bribes, flight capital,
illicit transactions in licit goods (such as arms transfers)
and the illegal funding of political parties are examples of
“hot money”, as is money loaned to developing countries
that is furtively invested in the developed world that gave
A/CONF.187/6
5
the loan. Credible estimates suggest that the proportion of
money laundered by organized crime only constitutes
around 10 per cent of the overall amount of “hot money”.
7,
9, 10
23. It is controversial whether organized criminal groups
teach or learn from deviant entrepreneurs and politicians.
It could be argued, for example, that transnational criminal
groups that invest illicit proceeds in the official economy
have learned from the techniques and the rationalizations
of white-collar and corporate offenders, thus being, in a
sense, corrupted by the economy rather than corrupting it.
24. Descriptions that characterize members of organized
criminal groups as being too visibly different or perhaps
too culturally and linguistically different, to become
accepted in the business world do not consider how
acceptance in that world is mediated by individuals and
groups who act as go-betweens. The investment of criminal
proceeds in the financial market, for example, forces
organized crime to open up to, and establish connections
with, mediators and agents who make pecunia non olet
(money does not smell) their favourite motto.
25. In brief, the encounter between transnational
organized crime and the official economy is not the result
of an unnatural relationship between a harmonious entity
and a dysfunctional one. Rather, it amounts to a joint
undertaking of two loosely regulated worlds, both
deviating from the rules they officially establish for
themselves. For example, the rules of fair competition are
often disregarded by those very legitimate entrepreneurs
who claim their universal validity and, similarly, the “rules
of honour” are ignored by criminal entrepreneurs who
claim their unconditional faith in them.
11
V. Points for discussion
26. In this chapter, a number of examples are given in an
attempt to prove that the intermingling of organized,
corporate and white-collar crime constitutes a specific
feature of transnational illegal organizations. Some
remarks accompanying the examples given are intended to
provide points of discussion and some food for thought.
27. Among the illegal activities conducted by
transnational organized crime, as already mentioned, those
associated with the trafficking in human beings are
paramount. In this respect, some authors appear to assume
that this activity is carried out by structured enterprises
engaged in specialistic, long-term undertakings. Related to
this assumption is the implicit association of this type of
activity with organized crime, therefore conveying the
notion that those engaged are full-time criminal
entrepreneurs who have developed expertise and
accumulated resources in previous illegal activities. Other
authors, instead, suggest that many of those involved in
trafficking in human beings have no previous criminal
record. Cases that have come to public attention suggest
that the second proposition is as close to reality as the first.
Enterprises involved in trafficking often derive their skills
and expertise from the licit arena of business in which they
operate. Travel agencies are involved, along with transport
companies, at times in connection with informal
employment agencies. Usually, none of the staff of such
agencies and companies has a criminal record much less a
link to organized crime. While committing offences that
organized criminal groups also commit, companies may
become partners of the latter, without sharing their overall
culture and strategies. To define such companies as
transnational organized crime adds to the definitional
chaos that already characterizes this type of crime.
Thought should, therefore, be given to the identification of
more nuanced definitions.
28. Transnational organized crime should not be
mistaken for activity conducted by centralized, highly
structured organizations and ruthless market operators.
Dispersed participants and diverse social actors are
involved in networks in which opportunistic chances are
taken and short-term alliances are set up.
12
29. According to some studies, traffickers frequently
maintain control of illegal migrants once they reach the
country of destination and force those trafficked to commit
crime, engage in prostitution or work for low wages,
13
although it has also been argued that girls and women are
recruited in their home country and are promised jobs
abroad but are later forced into prostitution. Studies have
also shown that illegal migrants who use the services of
traffickers experience debt bondage and that, in addition to
transportation, smugglers charge exorbitant rents for
substandard, abandoned or even condemned housing, and
that debts force immigrants to work in sweatshops.
5
30. It is inappropriate to portray such illicit business as
one exclusively characterized by a victimizer-victimized
relationship. Thought should be given to the fact that there
are both willing and unwilling victims, and that the very
concept of trafficking should be properly unravelled if
other dynamics are to be brought to light. According to the
International Organization for Migration, for example,
A/CONF.187/6
6
many women illegally entering developed countries are
fully aware of the type of job for which they are destined.
They often know, for example, that their work in the host
country will be in the sex industry. Some choose to pay a
fee to traffickers who, in this context, could be more
appropriately described as “illegal migration operators”.
Some of the women plan to stay in the host country for a
number of years and return home with sufficient money to
start a business. Upon returning, these women may display
their newly acquired economic status, describe the easy
ways in which money can be earned and talk about the
tolerance of the police and the enthusiasm of customers.
Sometimes, they may end up encouraging other women to
follow their example, therefore acting as facilitators or,
indeed, as “migration operators” themselves.
14
31. The conditions under which illegal migrants are
forced to work would not seem to be attributable to
traffickers, as responsibility for such conditions lies with
the labour market in which migrants are employed. Some
thought should be given to the increase in flexible and
casual work that is observed in most developed countries.
This increase has created a situation where workers with
low social and economic expectations are highly desirable.
Among these workers, illegal migrants seem to have a
formidable advantage because, as soon as their
expectations become higher, employers can report them to
the police as illegal. Paying a fee to traffickers is part and
parcel of this phenomenon, as migrants are taught that it is
a privilege to enter an economically advanced country and,
once there, they had better not ruin such a unique
opportunity by demanding too much. In sum, trafficking in
human beings could also be analysed within a
demand-supply framework, as illegal migrants employed
in the hidden economy, including the sex industry, meet a
specific demand in economically advanced countries. More
thought, therefore, should be given to the effects of a strict
immigration policy, which may lower the expectations of
migrants more than it limits their numbers.
32. Among the circumstances that generate official
anxiety is the fact that members of transnational criminal
groups take advantage of differences in legislation within
a country, moving across countries with a view to
exploiting normative loopholes and inconsistencies.
Therefore “criminal groups spread into sectors where the
risk of being arrested and heavily sentenced is relatively
low, especially compared to the attractive economic
return”.
15
Responses are advocated that may reduce such
normative inconsistencies while reducing the mobility of
transnational organized groups. The creation of agreements
between countries is among the most popular responses,
accompanied by the establishment of joint working groups
and cooperation between law enforcement agencies.
33. Thought should be given to the possibility that this
type of response, which entails that police forces around
the world coordinate their efforts, may contribute to the
establishment of networks and practices and of technical
and political alliances that escape democratic control of
both States and the international community. Fear of the
powerful threat posed by transnational organized crime, in
sum, may be exploited with a view to cutting normative
corners and eroding civil rights.
16
34. Consideration should also be given to the fact that
transnational organized crime traditionally creates demand
for the smuggled goods it brings into markets. As an
example, cigarette smuggling started in Mediterranean
countries as early as the 1950s and contributed to the
unpredicted success of certain cigarette brands and the
decline of local tobacco products. The current smuggling
of goods such as cars, clothes, computers and mobile
phones in developing countries and countries with
economies in transition may have the same effect, making
those countries totally dependent upon products from and
keen to adopt the lifestyles of developed countries.
35. There is widespread agreement that transnational
organized crime is the result of new criminal opportunities.
The nature and features of these opportunities deserve
brief examination. According to a distinction suggested by
Albanese,
17
there are opportunities that provide easy access
to illicit earnings with relatively low risk, and there are
opportunities created by offenders. The former include not
only the provision of illicit goods and services that are in
high demand but also opportunities that are the result of
social and technological change. Opportunities created by
offenders often involve bribery or extortion. Examples, in
this case, include protection rackets and frauds involving
otherwise legitimate business enterprises. However, some
forms of transnational organized crime make this
distinction extremely blurred, if not redundant.
Transnational organizations seize easy opportunities and
create new ones at the same time. Their modus operandi is
such that criminal acts become increasingly interdependent
and multifaceted.
15
Skills acquired in one field are utilized
in new markets, while partnerships are established with a
variety of actors, be they legitimate or otherwise. The
movement from one activity to the other, crucially, entails
an intermittent shift from areas that traditionally pertain to
organized crime to areas that are the traditional preserve of
A/CONF.187/6
7
white-collar or corporate crime. In brief, transnational
organized crime has some of the features of transnational
white- collar crime, as in the case of legitimate
corporations making bribery payments to foreign officials
to facilitate the marketing of their goods in countries where
those goods are banned.
18
More emphasis should be placed
on the notion that transnational crime encapsulates this
mixture of criminal conduct, which may be a reason for
serious concern.
36. This leads to a final consideration. There is a
widespread feeling that white-collar and corporate crime
are less stigmatized and penalized than conventional
organized crime. With the interconnection of these types of
criminal behaviour, the relative tolerance normally
accorded to white-collar criminals may be extended to
members of conventional organized criminal groups.
37. Further research into the causes of the various types
of transnational crime is vital. The effects of deterrence
and penalization and the role of law enforcement should
also be studied.
VI. Implementation of the United
Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized
Crime and the protocols thereto
38. In its resolution 54/125 of 17 December 1999, the
General Assembly decided that the Tenth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders should devote particular attention to ways and
means of making operational the provisions of the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, especially taking into account the needs of
developing countries in the area of capacity-building. In its
resolution 54/126 of 17 December 1999, the Assembly
requested the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime to
intensify its work in order to complete it in the year 2000.
As a result of the satisfactory progress in the negotiations
on the draft Convention and its draft Protocols, it is
expected that the instruments will be adopted by the
Millennium Assembly.
39. The draft Convention in its present form contains
four articles related to its implementation. According to
one of those articles, a Conference of the Parties to the
Convention would be established to improve the capacity
of States parties to implement the Convention. The
Conference of the Parties would be charged with agreeing
upon mechanisms to, inter alia, facilitate activities by
States parties under the articles of the Convention dealing
with technical cooperation, including by mobilizing
voluntary contributions, and to review periodically the
status of implementation of the Convention. The
Conference of the Parties would be informed of the
measures taken by States parties in implementing the
Convention and of the difficulties encountered. Articles
related to implementation also deal with the secretariat of
the Conference of the Parties, training and technical
assistance, and measures for the implementation of the
Convention through economic development and technical
assistance.
40. In view of the ground-breaking nature of the
Convention and its three protocols, their implementation
will pose significant challenges to States and the United
Nations. Many States will need to put in place new or
amend existing legislation, as well as to strengthen their
law enforcement structures and criminal justice systems, in
order to be able to comply with their obligations under the
Convention and its protocols. On many occasions, such
action will be required in order for the States to ratify or
accede to the Convention and its protocols. For many
States, legislating in accordance with the provisions of the
Convention and its protocols will require expertise and
know-how that may not be available domestically. Putting
in place new or amending existing legislation may also
require knowledge of the choices made by other States, as
well as the experience gained by them, in drafting and
implementing such legislation. Strengthening law
enforcement structures and bringing about the necessary
improvements on criminal justice systems will require the
development of human resources, through training and the
upgrading of skills, as well as the acquisition or
modernization of equipment and the development or
upgrading of facilities. Consequently, there will be a need
to make available technical assistance at the earliest
possible stage of the implementation process.
41. While some of this assistance might be provided at
the bilateral or regional level, the United Nations will have
a central role to play in fostering and sustaining
implementation of the Convention and its protocols.
Following the adoption of the Convention and its
protocols, the Centre for International Crime Prevention
will promote their signature and ratification, thereby
ensuring the expeditious entry into force of the
instruments. The Centre will need to provide advisory
A/CONF.187/6
8
1
Fijnaut and others, Organized Crime in the Netherlands (The
Hague, Kluwer, 1998).
2
H. Abadinsky, “The criminal elite: professional and organized
crime”, Contributions in Criminology and Penology, No. 1
(Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1983).
3
V. Ruggiero, Organized and Corporate Crime in Europe:
Offers that Can’t Be Refused (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996).
4
P. Williams and E. Savona, eds., The United Nations and
transnational crime (London, Frank Cass, 1996).
5
P. Reuter and C. Petrie, eds., Transnational Organized Crime
(Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 1999).
6
J. Albanese, Organized Crime in America, 3rd ed. (Cincinnati,
Anderson, 1996).
7
Banca d’Italia, Il riciclaggio nel contesto dei rapporti tra
economia criminale ed economia legale (Rome, Banca
d’Italia/Ufficio Italiano Cambi/Osservatorio Antiriciclaggio,
1999).
8
P. Arlacchi, “Corruption, organised crime and money
laundering world wide”, in M. Punch, ed., Coping with
Corruption in a Borderless World (The Hague, Kluwer, 1993).
9
I. Walter, Secret Money (London, George Allen and Unwin,
1989).
10
M. Hampton, The Offshore Interface: Tax Haven in the
Global Economy (London, Macmillan, 1996).
11
V. Ruggiero, Delitti dei deboli e dei potenti: Esercizi di
anticriminologia (Turin, Bollati Boringhieri, 1999).
12
P. Williams, Organizing Transnational Crime: Networks,
Markets and Hierarchies, Washington (Ridgeway Centre,
University of Pittsburgh, 1998).
13
L. Shelley, “Transnational crime in the United States: The
scope of the problem”, paper presented at the workshop on
Transnational Organized Crime, National Research Council,
17-18 June 1998, Washington, D.C.).
14
M. Gramegna, “Trafficking in human beings in sub-Saharan
Africa: The case of Nigeria”, paper presented at “New
Frontiers of Crime: Trafficking in Human Beings and New
Forms of Slavery”, Verona, 22-23 October 1999.
15
S. Adamoli and others, Organized Crime Around the World
(Helsinki, European Institute for Crime Prevention and
Control, affiliated with the United Nations, 1998), p. ix.
16
J. Sheptycki, “Transnational policing and the makings of a
postmodern State”, British Journal of Criminology, 34: 613-
635, 1996.
17
J. Albanese, “The causes of organized crime”, paper presented
at the International Conference on Organized Crime,
University of Lausanne, 6-8 October 1999.
18
N. Passas, “The genesis of the BCCI scandal”, Journal of Law
and Society, No. 23 (1996), pp. 57-72.
services to assist States in preparing legislation required
under the Convention. The Centre will also need to
organize training courses and provide other forms of
assistance to requesting States to support national efforts
aimed at strengthening the capacity of their law
enforcement and criminal justice systems to comply with
their treaty obligations. Following the entry into force of
the Convention and its protocols, the Centre will need to
develop a comprehensive technical cooperation
programme to assist interested States in complying with the
provisions of the new instruments and in putting those
provisions into effect.
42. The Conference of the Parties is to be convened no
later than one year after the entry into force of the
Convention. The Centre for International Crime
Prevention, as the secretariat of the Conference of the
Parties, is to assist the Conference in fulfilling its
functions.
43. To carry out the above-mentioned tasks, the Centre
for International Crime Prevention will need to be
strengthened. Additional resources should be allocated to
the Centre to enable it to support States in their efforts to
ratify the Convention and its protocols and implement the
provisions of those instruments. In addition, the Centre
will need to be provided with adequate resources to assist
the Conference of the Parties in carrying out its work.
Notes
